This was primarily a conflict between state law and the FAA. As a general rule, the Supreme Court adjourns the interpretation of state law by a Circuit Court, unless the law is anticipated by federal law. The contractual doctrine cited by the Ninth Arrondissement is exclusively a product of state law, even if it is applied by a federal court. The application of such a doctrine is in direct contradiction to the fundamental principle of the FAA, which provides that an arbitration procedure is a matter of consent between the parties and can only be applied under the terms of the agreement. The argument continued to revolve around Shanmugam`s question when Justice Elena Kagan weighed in to propose an agreement with Breyer`s perspective. As she said, “the parties never really thought about who would decide these unfounded arbitrator claims, or perhaps, if they considered it, would they have thought that sending it to an arbitrator was a strange enough system, just so that the arbitrator could send it back to court?” In that case, the court, referring to earlier Supreme Court decisions, provided that class arbitration cannot be inferred from an agreement, because there are fundamental differences between class and individual arbitration. Parties generally opt for arbitration because of the cost-cutting potential and efficiency of the process. Class arbitration is in direct contradiction to these objectives because it slows down the process and increases costs. At least for Gorsuch, Breyer`s analysis seemed to point the way to an appropriate solution: “Not your real complaint … that there may be only one valid argument to say that, in this case, there is no clear and obvious evidence of the desire to go to arbitration and to have the arbitrator`s decision on the arbitrator`s decision.
And why doesn`t he care about 90% of these cases? Once you look at the first question, the parties agreed to send this type of litigation to an arbitration tribunal, and then you start getting on the second issue, they have this kind, that kind, you`re really an arbitrator…. And although it saves time in a handful of cases, time will be wasted overall. So read it for what he says. He hands the decision over to the arbitrator to make the referee`s decision. What`s wrong? Justice Stephen Breyer followed up with one of his typically bizarre assumptions and examined Shanmugam`s position that the courts must approve all arbitration applications based on an arbitration agreement with a corresponding gateway clause, no matter how ridiculous the right to arbitration is: “Suppose it`s really strange. … He says my claim here is a Martian told me to [ask for arbitration]. Tell me, anyway… Are there no exceptions, anything? By the way, the referee likes the Martians. The problem often arises when two parties have signed a contract with a provision requiring arbitration, but do not accept that a particular dispute falls within the provision. In this case, for example, the contract required arbitration proceedings for any “dispute that is related to or related to” the contract “with the exception of the termination actions”.” The complaint sought tens of millions of dollars in damages for alleged violations of the Sherman Act, as well as various parallel state laws, as well as requests for omission. Irrespective of the motion for omission – which appears not to place the dispute outside the compromise clause – the defendants sought arbitration proceedings on the grounds that the main intent of the complaint was to seek damages and that any action for an appropriate termination could be made after the arbitrator had ruled on the merits of the damages appeal.  Chaplain J.
also referred to a case in which the court refused to quash the compromise clause if the labeer renovator mentioned in the clause did not exist.